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Background: At the beginning of 2007, health care reforms were implemented in Hungary in order to decrease
public expenditure on health care. Reforms involved the increase of co-payments for pharmaceuticals and the
introduction of co-payments for health care services.
Objective: The objective of this paper is to examine the progressivity of household expenditure on health care
during the reform period, separately for expenditures on pharmaceuticals and medical devices, as well as for formal
and informal patient payments for health care services.
Methods: We use data on household expenditure from the Household Budget Survey carried out by the Central
Statistical Office of Hungary. We present household expenditure as a percentage of household income across
different income quintiles and calculate Kakwani indexes as a measure of progressivity for a four years period
(2005–2008): before, during and after the implementation of the health care reforms.
Results: We find that out-of-pocket payments on health care are highly regressive in Hungary with a Kakwani index
of −0.22. In particular, households from the lowest income quintile spend an about three times larger share of their
income on out-of-pocket payments (6–7 %) compared to households in the highest income quintile (2 %).
Expenditures on pharmaceuticals and medical devices are the most regressive types of expenditure (Kakwani index
−0.23/-0.24), and at the same time they represent a major part of the total household expenditure on health care
(78–85 %). Informal payments are also regressive while expenditures on formal payments for services are the most
proportional to income. We find that expenditures on formal payments became regressive after the introduction of
user fees (Kakwani index −0.1). At the same time, we observe that expenditures on informal payments became less
regressive during the reform period (Kakwani index increases from −0.20/-0.18 to −0.12.)
Conclusions: More attention should be paid on the protection of low-income social groups when increasing or
introducing co-payments especially for pharmaceuticals but also for services. Also, it is important to eliminate the
practice of informal payments in order to improve equity in health care financing.
Keywords: Household expenditure, Health care reforms, Equity, Kakwani index, Hungary* Correspondence: petra.baji@uni-corvinus.hu
1Health Economics and Health Technology Assessment Research Centre,
Corvinus University of Budapest, Budapest, Hungary
2Center for Public Affairs Studies Foundation, Budapest, Hungary
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article
© 2012 Baji et al.; licensee BioMed Central Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Baji et al. International Journal for Equity in Health 2012, 11:36 Page 2 of 11
http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/11/1/36Introduction
Out-of-pocket payments already represent a non-
negligible part of total health care expenditure in Central
and Eastern European countries [1]. However, reform
arrangements intended to decrease public expenditure
on health care often lead to the further increase of out-
of-pocket payments in health care financing. According
to the results of previous studies, out-of-pocket pay-
ments are a regressive means of financing health care
(e.g. [2-4]). Thus, households with lower income spend
a relatively higher share of their income on health care
than those with higher income. This is in conflict with
the European health policy targets, which argue that
the ability to pay rather than the health status should
determine health care payments. In other words, the
distribution of health care payments should be in line
with the distribution of households’ income rather than
with the actual consumption of health care (e.g. [1,3]).
Reform arrangements, which lead to the increasing role
of out-of pocket payments in health care financing,
might lead to even higher differences between income
groups, inducing a greater burden falling on the worse-
off households [5-7].
In this paper we analyze the progressivity of
households’ out-of-pocket payments for health care in
Hungary, where at the beginning of 2007, health care
reforms were carried out in order to decrease public
expenditures on health care. Besides structural and
regulative arrangements, the austerity measures resulted
in increased patient co-payments for pharmaceuticals
and in the introduction of co-payments for using health
care services.
The aim of our paper is to examine the progressivity
of household expenditure on health care during a four
years period (2005–2008): before, during and after the
implementation of the health care reforms. We are par-
ticularly interested in whether we can observe significant
changes in the distribution of household expenditure on
health care across income groups after the implementa-
tion of the reforms. For the analysis, we use data from
the Household Budget Survey carried out by the Central
Statistical Office of Hungary a. We consider total house-
hold expenditure on health care as well as its comprising
elements, namely household expenditures on pharma-
ceuticals and medical devices, and on formal and infor-
mal patient payments for health care services. Kakwani
indexes by types of expenditures are estimated to indi-
cate the progressivity of household expenditure on
health care (see [8,9]). Our study provides evidence on
how austerity measures in the health care system, such
as those carried out in Hungary at the beginning of
2007, can affect the progressivity of households’ out-of-
pocket payments and whether the changes can lead to a
relatively greater burden on lower income households.Our results are relevant to countries with a similar
structure of health care financing, facing similar chal-
lenges, especially to countries in the Central and Eastern
European region.
Background: Overview of the reforms in the
Hungarian health care sector in 2006–2007
In Hungary the mandatory health insurance system is
funded by income-related social health insurance contri-
butions. The contributions of those who are eligible for
services, but are not obligated to pay contributions
(e.g. children under the age 18, students, pensioners,
disabled, women on maternity leave) are covered by
the state budget.
The National Health Insurance Fund Administration
(NHIFA) is the single health insurance payer, which
administers the Health Insurance Fund (HIF). HIF cov-
ers the recurrent costs of health services, and finances
certain cash benefits, such as sick pay. Capital costs are
covered by the local and the central governments. The
HIF is divided into more than 30 sub-budgets according
to the type of service (e.g. acute inpatient care, chronic
inpatient care and outpatient specialist care). Primary
care is mostly organized based on private practices hav-
ing a gate-keeping role. Thus, a referral is needed to visit
a specialist except for some services (e.g. dermatological,
gynaecological, laryngological, ophthalmological psychi-
atric services). The vast majority of polyclinics and hos-
pitals are owned by municipalities or the state. Primary
care is reimbursed by the NHIFA on a capitation base,
while a fee-for-service point system works as a basis for
financing out-patient specialist care. Inpatient-care is
financed based on diagnosis-related groups [10-12].
The total health expenditure in Hungary accounts
for 7.4 % of the GDP in 2009, lower than the OECD
average (9.7 %). The total health expenditure per capita is
1,511 USD, which is less than half of the OECD average
(3361 USD). Public expenditure accounts for 69.7 % of
total health spending [13].
The NHIFA has been facing continuous deficits since
its foundation in 1993. The deficit varied from 3.4 % of
the total revenue of the Fund in 1994, to 31.2 % of the
total revenue in 2005. The cumulative deficit amounted
to 1,500 billion HUF (6 billion EUR) in 2005, which is
equal to the annual budget of the Fund [14]. The deficit
of the NHIFA has led to an increased burden on the
state budget as the government is obliged to cover any
shortfall in the Health Insurance Found, and shortfalls
in the HIF appear in the government budget deficit [10].
Due to the continuous deficit of the NHIFA, the health
care system was one of the fields where the Hungarian
government had to consider reforms as a part of the
Convergence Program of Hungary at the end of 2006
[15]. The objective of the Convergence Program was to
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criteria of the EU for joining the Euro zone (i.e. the
ratio of the annual government deficit to gross domes-
tic product must not exceed 3 % at the end of the pre-
ceding fiscal year and the total state debt must not go
beyond 60 % of the GDP [16]). The resulting austerity
measures in the health care system in 2006–2007
aimed to decrease public health care expenditure as a
percentage of GDP. The reforms affected the regula-
tion, structure and financing of the health care system.
Reforms involved the increase of patient co-payments
for pharmaceuticals as well as the introduction of co-
payments for the use of public health care services, and
co-insurance in the case of a free choice of physician
which led to the increase of the role of out-of-pocket
patient payments in health care financing (see Table 1).
However, co-payments for health care services wereTable 1 Overview of the Hungarian health care reforms in 20
The expansion of contributing payers
The reforms aimed to settle the eligibility criteria for the health for insuranc
who are eligible for services, but were not obligated to pay contributions
women on maternity leave) is to be covered by the state budget. Those wh
self-employed workers are obliged to pay insurance contributions. The
members and agricultural workers. According to the NHIFA’s estimations
uncertain before the reform [18].
Changes in health insurance coverage
The introduction of co-payments. Co-payments for public health care servic
visit and per day hospitalization). Children and some patients with chronic
retained by the health care provider. The aim was to make consumers mor
as well as to eradicate informal patient payments in Hungary [17,46].
Restricted choice of patients to use health care services. The government also aimed
the regulation out-patient and in-patient care could only be accessed based o
patients’ choice of health care provider has been restricted. Patients could be adm
co-payments (30 percent of the hospital cost) should be paid, if patients wanted
A new act on pharmaceuticals
The Act on the Secure and Efficient Supply of Pharmaceuticals and Medical
Parliament in November 2006 (Act2006./XCVIII.). This reform was expected t
of patients in financing (i.e. by decreasing subsidies on pharmaceuticals) as
sharing mechanisms between payer and the pharmaceutical companies
regulating the drug prescription system; 3) and to create price-compet
pharmaceutical market.
Decreasing subsidies and increasing co-payments. NHIFA reimburses drugs
drugs 3) Normative reimbursement. The measure of the subsidies is a def
reimbursements on pharmaceuticals were decreased. First, for drugs belon
rates have been decreased from 50 % to 25 %; from 70 % to 55 %; and
pharmaceuticals the reimbursement rate of 90 % was reconsidered, and re
where drugs are 100 % subsidized, a minimum 300 HUF co-payment per bo
Structural reforms
The new system of high priority and territorial hospitals was established in A
and 37 high priority hospitals were set up. Structural reforms concerned the
bed capacity was cut by 16 000 beds (~ 27 %), while chronic bed capacity i
The establishment of Health Insurance Supervisory Authority
The Health Insurance Supervisory Authority (HISA) was established in Dece
The Authority was also responsible for investigating patients’ complaints.
Note: Beyond these changes, the transformation of the health insurance system wa
model by competing Health Insurance Management Funds never materialized in pr
Parliament in May 2008.abolished at the beginning of 2008, as a result of a
population referendum [17].
As a result of the reform arrangements, total health
care expenditure as a percentage of GDP decreased from
8.1 % in 2006 to 7.4 % in 2007. Public health care ex-
penditure decreased compared to the year before by
1.8 % in nominal terms and 9.1 % in real terms. In fact,
the share of public health care expenditure dropped
from 72.5 % to 70.3 % [13]. Also, the NHIFA registered
savings in 2007. During this period, the NHIFA’s expend-
iture on pharmaceuticals decreased by 17 % due to the
cost-containment measures such as the increase of pa-
tient co-payments for pharmaceuticals [20,22,23].
Methods: data and analysis
We use data on household expenditure from the
Household Budget Survey carried out by the Central07
e coverage. According to the new regulations, the contributions of those
(children under the age 18, students, pensioners, disability-pensioners,
o do not belong to these categories and who were either employees or
payment obligations have also been expanded to dependent family
, the status of more than 1 million citizens in the NHIFA register was
es (called “visit fees”) were introduced in February, 2007 (~ 1.1 euro per
conditions were exempted. The revenues from these co-payments were
e cost-conscious and to regulate demand for public health care services,
to enforce a system of referrals in the public health care sector. According to
n a referral issued at the lower levels of the health care system. In addition,
itted only to 2-3 hospitals in the region where the patients are living. Higher
to attend hospitals (or physicians) in another region. (see Act 1997/ LXXXIII.)
Aids and on the General Rules of Pharmaceutical Trade was adopted by
o reduce public expenditure on pharmaceuticals by 1) enforcing the role
well as the role of pharmaceutical companies (by the introduction of risk
and the increasing taxes on promotion), 2) supporting generics by
ition between pharmaceutical companies by the liberalisation of the
in three categories: 1) Fully reimbursed drugs 2) Indication dependent
ined percentage of the negotiated gross price of the medicine. In 2007
ging to the category of normative reimbursement, the reimbursement
from 90 % to 85 %. For drugs in the category of indication dependent
placed by three subsidy categories (50, 70, 90 %). In the third category,
x was introduced [20].
pril, 2007 based on the Act . 2006./CXXXII. In total, 77 territorial hospitals
decease of the number of hospital beds in inpatient care as well. Acute
ncreased by 7500 (~31 %) in 2007 [21].
mber, 2006 to monitor contracts between the NHIFA and the providers.
s planned as well. However, the idea of replacing the single-payer insurance
actice. The Act on Health Insurance Management Funds was revoked by
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2006, 2007 and 2008. The Central Household Budget
Survey (HBS) provides detailed information on yearly
expenditure on housing conditions and consumer dur-
ables according to the detailed grouping of Classifica-
tion of Individual Consumption by Purpose (COICOP)
international nomenclature b. It also provides data on
the social-demographic characteristics of the household.
The data collection consists of two parts: 1/12 of the
selected households (about 750 households) keep a diary
on their expenses and income for a month followed by a
retrospective interview about their income and excep-
tional expenditures at the next year after the reference
year. c The dataset contains data for 9058 households in
2005, 8975 households in 2006, 8547 households in
2007, and 7650 households in 2008.
In this analysis, we examine four types of household
expenditure on health care:
– expenditures on pharmaceutical products, medical
aids and other medical products (appliances and
equipments) – henceforth called as pharmaceuticals
and medical devices.
– formal payments for public and private health care
services (incl. fees for GPs, outpatient physicians,
dental care and hospital services both in the private
and the public sector, services of laboratories and x-
ray centers, ambulance services, services of freelance
nurses, midwives and acupuncturists, chiropractors,
optometrists and various types of therapists)
– informal payments for health care services (informal
payments for GP, out-patient and in-patient care,
dentist and ambulance);
– total health care expenditure (incl. the sum of the
first three types of expenditure described above).
We present these types of expenditures by income
quintiles as a percentage of the net yearly household in-
come (also available from the HBS survey). To examine
the progressivity of household expenditure on health
care, we also calculate the Kakwani index. Kakwani in-
dexes are estimated using the regression formula sug-
gested by Kakwani et al. (1997) [9].
This index is widely used for measuring progression in
taxation and also, the progression of out-of-pocket pay-
ments [2-4]. Recent applications of the index in health
care can be found for example in Hanley et al. (2008)
and Smith (2010) [24-26]. The index is defined, as twice
the area between the payments’ concentration curve and
the income (Lorenz) curve. The value of Kakwani index
ranges from −2 to 1. A negative value indicates regres-
sive payments, i.e. in households with lower income the
share of expenditure as a percentage of income is higher
than in households with higher income. A positive valueindicates a progressive distribution, i.e. in households
with lower income the share of expenditure is lower
than in households with higher income. In the case of
proportionality, the concentration curve coincides with
the Lorenz curve and the Kakwani index is zero [27].
Results
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics on the different
types of health care expenditure as well as the net yearly
household income of the households by income quintiles
during the period 2005–2008. In that period, total
household expenditure on health care increased from
3.7 % to 4.4 % of the net household income. This share
varies between 2.1-2.5 % of the household income in the
highest income quintile to 6.1-7.3 % of the household in-
come in the lower income quintiles.
The major cost driver of households’ health care ex-
penditure are the expenditures on pharmaceuticals and
medical devices, which represent 78 % of total expend-
iture in 2005, and this share increases to 85 % in
2008. This share is the highest in the lower income
quintiles, varying between 81–89 % of total household
health care expenditure, while the share is the lowest
(70–79 %) in the higher income quintiles. Expenditures
on pharmaceuticals and medical devices increase from
2.9 % in 2005 and 2006 to 3.7 % of net household in-
come in 2008.
Formal payments for health care services account for
0.5-0.6 % of household income. Its share in total house-
hold expenditure on health care is 13 % in 2005 and
2006, which increases to 15 % in 2007 with the introduc-
tion of co-payments for health care services, and
decreases to 11 % in 2008 with the abolishment of these
fees. Households in the lowest income quintile pay a
3.2-3.6 times higher share of their income on these
items. The share of the expenditures on formal pay-
ments is the highest in the highest income quintile (17–
22 %), while it is lowest in the lowest income quintile
(7–13 %). Households from the highest income quintile
pay only a 1.2-1.9 times higher share of their income on
these items than households from the lowest quintile.
Informal payments account for 0.2-0.3 % of the house-
hold income. These payments represent 9 % of the total
expenditure in 2005 and 2007, and decrease to 4 % and
5 % in 2007 and 2008 respectively. The share of these
payments in total expenditure is rather equal among in-
come quintiles (varying between 8–10 % before the re-
form period, and 4–6 % after the reform.)
In Figure 1, the charts on the left side illustrate the
trend of the share of different types of health care ex-
penditure as a percentage of income. On the charts on
the right side, the concentration curves of the different
types of expenditures graphically illustrate how the
expenditures are distributed across the households
Table 2 Household expenditure on health care
Year Quintile 2005 2006 2007 2008
Expenditure mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd
Income (Thousand HUF) 1st 920 213 951*** 245 889*** 208 882 202
2nd 1 539 159 1 586*** 159 1 468*** 160 1 442*** 165
3rd 2101 175 2157*** 174 2 020*** 166 1 972*** 161
4th 2 790 239 2 840*** 238 2 686*** 227 2 609*** 214
5th 4 622 1 802 4 627*** 1 992 4 333*** 1 726 4 062*** 1 171
Total 2 394 1 518 2 433*** 1 556 2 279*** 1 426 2 193*** 1 225
Pharmaceuticals and medical
devices (% of income)
1st 4.96 % 5.41 % 5.29 % 6.75 % 6.00 %*** 6.96 % 6.56 %** 8.05 %
2nd 3.53 % 4.20 % 3.43 % 4.10 % 4.10 %*** 4.67 % 4.40 %* 5.02 %
3rd 2.38 % 3.02 % 2.42 % 2.95 % 3.03 %*** 3.87 % 3.26 %* 3.73 %
4th 1.90 % 2.34 % 1.89 % 2.15 % 2.26 %*** 2.69 % 2.33 % 2.75 %
5th 1.54 % 1.72 % 1.47 % 1.67 % 1.75 %*** 2.14 % 1.97 %*** 2.20 %
Total 2.86 % 3.80 % 2.90 % 4.19 % 3.43 %*** 4.66 % 3.71 %*** 5.10 %
Formal payments (% of income) 1st 0.62 % 2.36 % 0.77 % 6.04 % 0.91 % 2.86 % 0.49 %*** 2.06 %
2nd 0.42 % 1.36 % 0.45 % 1.56 % 0.67 %*** 1.57 %% 0.43 %*** 1.49 %
3rd 0.50 % 1.47 % 0.36 %*** 1.10 % 0.61 %*** 1.57 % 0.46 %** 2.12 %
4th 0.41 % 1.15 % 0.45 % 1.49 % 0.52 % 1.64 % 0.49 % 1.70 %
5th 0.48 % 1.28 % 0.41 %* 0.95 % 0.49 %** 1.26 % 0.42 % 1.27 %
Total 0.49 % 1.58 % 0.49 % 2.95 % 0.64 %*** 1.87 % 0.46 %*** 1.76 %
Informal payments (% of income) 1st 0.51 % 1.50 % 0.56 % 1.92 % 0.26 %*** 0.81 % 0.28 % 1.37 %
2nd 0.43 % 1.59 % 0.38 % 1.13 % 0.23 %*** 0.70 % 0.29 %** 1.01 %
3rd 0.27 % 0.71 % 0.29 % 1.38 % 0.19 %*** 0.67 % 0.18 % 0.61 %
4th 0.25 % 0.78 % 0.22 % 0.66 % 0.15 %*** 0.52 % 0.19 % 1.65 %
5th 0.18 % 0.61 % 0.20 % 0.62 % 0.14 %** 0.63 % 0.10 %** 0.36 %
Total 0.33 % 1.13 % 0.33 % 1.25 % 0.19 %*** 0.67 % 0.21 % 1.11 %
Total (% of income) 1st 6.10 % 6.60 % 6.62 %* 11.54 % 7.18 % 8.20 % 7.34 % 9.13 %
2nd 4.38 % 5.10 % 4.26 % 4.89 % 5.00 %*** 5.32 % 5.11 % 5.87 %
3rd 3.14 % 3.72 % 3.07 % 3.69 % 3.82 %*** 4.54 % 3.90 % 4.53 %
4th 2.56 % 2.96 % 2.56 % 2.95 % 2.93 %*** 3.42 % 3.01 % 3.86 %
5th 2.20 % 2.46 % 2.08 % 2.21 % 2.38 %*** 2.81 % 2.50 % 2.75 %
Total 3.68 % 4.65 % 3.72 % 6.28 % 4.26 %*** 5.48 % 4.37 % 5.93 %
Note: 1 EUR 250 HUF during the examined period; income is indicated on 2007 price level indexed by CPI 2005–2006:+3.9 %; 2006–2007:+0.8 %; 2007–2008:
+0.61 %; t-test is used to compare the values between the years (H0:the share equal to the share in the previous year): *p< 0.1; **p< 0.05; ***p< 0.001.
The reform period (year 2007) is indicated by bold letters.
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The concentration curve plots the cumulative percent-
age of different types of expenditures (and also income)
on the vertical axis against the cumulative percentage of
households ranked by their household income on the
horizontal axis, beginning with the poorest and ending
with the richest. d
Table 3 presents the value of the Kakwani index for
the different types of health care expenditure. The nega-
tive values of the Kakwani index indicate that the distri-
bution is regressive for the total household expenditure
on health care, approximately −0.22 in all four yearsexamined. This indicates that, lower-income households
spend a higher share of their income on health care than
better-off households.
The lowest value of the Kakwani index is found for
pharmaceuticals and medical devices, varying between
−0.24 in 2005, 2006 and 2007 and −0.23 in 2008, which
indicates that this is the most regressive type of payment.
Graphically, the curve of the expenditures on pharma-
ceuticals and medical devices is close to diagonal.
The Kakwani index is close to 0 in the case of formal
payments, i.e. the coefficient is not significantly differ-
ent from zero in 2005, 2006 and 2008, and significantly
Figure 1 The trend and concentration of the three types of household expenditure on health care.
Table 3 Kakwani indexes by type of expenditures
Kakwani index by type of expenditures 2005 2006 2007 2008
Pharmaceuticals and medical devices −0.235*** (−32.03) −0.238*** (−32.39) −0.240*** (−31.11) −0.233*** (−30.99)
Formal payments for health care services −0.004 (−0.19) −0.024 (−1.21) −0.096*** (−5.13) −0.009 (−0.36)
Informal payments for health care services −0.203*** (−10.04) −0.182*** (−8.64) −0.121*** (−5.07) −0.200*** (−5.48)
Total expenditure on health care −0.220*** (−32.79) −0.224*** (−33.00) −0.220*** (−29.94) −0.215*** (−29.44)
Note: *** p< 0.01; t-statistics are in parenthesis.
The reform period (year 2007) is indicated by bold letters.
Baji et al. International Journal for Equity in Health 2012, 11:36 Page 6 of 11
http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/11/1/36
Baji et al. International Journal for Equity in Health 2012, 11:36 Page 7 of 11
http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/11/1/36different from 0 in 2007 with the value of −0.10. This
indicates proportionality of formal payments in 2005,
2006 and 2008. The graphs also show that formal
payments for health care services follow the income
(Lorenz) curve.
Expenditures on informal payments are regressive as
well. The Kakwani index for informal payments varies
between −0.18/-0.20 before and after the reforms. Its
value increases to −0.12 in 2007.
From Figure 1, we can also visually observe the
changes in the expenditures during the examined period.
We observe no relevant changes in the progressivity of
the payments during the examined period concerning
expenditures on pharmaceuticals and medical devices.
However, we do observe that in 2007, with the introduc-
tion of co-payments, the curve of the expenditures on
formal payments diverges from the diagonal, which indi-
cates that these payments become more regressive.
However, the curve converge to the diagonal again in
2008 (which indicates proportionality of the expendi-
tures), after the abolishment of co-payments. The curve
of the expenditures on informal payments converges to
the diagonal in 2007 compared to the other years exam-
ined, which indicates that informal payments became
less regressive in 2007.
Discussion of the results
We find that the burden of household expenditure on
health care is not equally distributed among different in-
come groups. Households from the lowest income quin-
tile pay an about three times larger share of their
income on health care compared to households in the
highest income quintile.
Our results confirm the conclusion of previous studies,
which found that out-of-pocket payments are a regres-
sive means of raising health care revenues [2-5]. Examin-
ing some OECD countries, Wagstaff et al. (1999) found
that out-of-pocket payments are most proportional to
income in Germany and the Netherlands (Kakwani
index higher than −0.1 %) and the highest in Switzerland
(−0.36) and France (−0.34) (similar to the US (−0.38))
where the poor without insurance coverage rely mostly
on out-of-pocket payments [3]. We find that the Kak-
wani index of total household expenditure on health is
approximately −0.2 during the examined period in Hun-
gary, which is comparable to the findings for the United
Kingdom and Finland [3,28].
Concerning the neighboring countries and countries
from the Central-European region, in Slovakia the
Kakwani index of out-of pocket payments is −0.25 in
2004 and −0.23 in 2005 [29], which is comparable to
our findings for Hungary. In Croatia, even higher
inequalities can be found. Persons from the lowest in-
come deciles pay an about six times larger share oftheir income on health care than the highest income
deciles [5]. However, in the Central European region,
the Czech Republic is an exception, where the share of
out-of-pocket payments as a percentage of household
income is much lower than found in our study (1.9 %
in 2007, 2.2 % in 2008) and it is also distributed quite
evenly across households [30].
Two previous studies reported Kakwani indexes of the
out-of-pocket payments in Hungary [10]. Szende et al.
(2002) find Kakwani indexes of −0.28 in 1999 and Csaba
(2007) −0.27 in 2007 [31,32]. These values are slightly
lower than those that we find in our study. The differ-
ence might be explained by differences in the method-
ology as previous studies calculated the index based on
individual-level data, while we use expenditure data on
household level. These studies however focus on data
from one year and do not examine the trends in the
equity of the payments.
We find that household expenditures on pharmaceuti-
cals and medical devices are the most regressive types of
expenditures (the lowest income quintile pays 3.6 times
more as a share of income than the highest quintile in
2007). At the same time, these payments represent the
major share of the total household expenditure on health
care (75–85 %). The lack of adequate protection
mechanisms in the pharmaceutical subsidy system might
be the main reason for this finding. In Hungary, no ceil-
ing for co-payments for pharmaceuticals and medical
devices is applied, and the co-payments do not depend
on income either. However, there is a rather controver-
sial system for exemptions of vulnerable social groups
from such co-payments. Some patients with disability or
with an income below a certain level e are eligible for ex-
emption from paying co-payments. During the examined
period relevant changes took place in the exemption sys-
tem. Since July 2006, for patients who are eligible for
exemptions a certain budget is defined by their GP based
on their medical needs. This budget should not exceed
12 000 HUF (~ 44 euros) per months. (Before, there was
a list of pharmaceuticals and medical devices which were
available free of charge for patients with a special certifi-
cate, without any limitation of the quantity or the
amount). f However, according to the monitor of the
National Auditory Office the number of patients eligible
for exemption because of their income decreased by
56 % from 2005 to 2006, moreover the office found the
system non-transparent, exemptions are not based on
the real needs [33]. Our results suggest that protection
of vulnerable social groups should be revised and
extended to improve equity of these payments. Never-
theless it has been shown in previous studies that the
lack of exemption mechanisms can produce inequalities
in access to health care, which can lead to higher mor-
bidity, emergency care admissions and mortality [34,35].
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Hungarian population is already lagging behind other
European countries [10].
The high share of expenditures on pharmaceuticals
and medical devices (which was observed in Hungary) is
a common characteristic observed in most of the Central
and Eastern European countries that joined the EU after
2004. Here, the expenditures on pharmaceuticals and
medical devices account for more than 70 % of total
health expenditure, while this share is below 50 % in the
EU15 countries [36]. In Central and Eastern European
countries, medicines are rarely included in the basic
package, so patients are obliged to pay out-of-pocket.
The relatively low labour cost in these countries could
hold the prices of services low even in the private sector
in contrast with the price of pharmaceuticals and med-
ical devices, which are comparable with those in West-
ern European countries.
Payments for health care services represent a minor
share of total household expenditures on health care.
According to our results around 20–40 % of these pay-
ments are informal payments for health care services.
We find that expenditures on informal payments are
regressive, which confirms previous results of Szende
and Culyer (2006) on informal payments in Hungary
[37]. This implies that the amount of informal pay-
ments initiated by patients or requested by medical staff
is not related to the patients’ ability to pay. Thus,
expenditures on informal payments impose a relatively
higher burden on worse-off households, and might lead
to inequalities to access.
However, expenditures on formal payments are found
to be the most proportional to income. The explanation
of this finding might be that before the introduction of
co-payments in 2007 (as well as after the abolishment of
the fees), most of the health care services covered by the
social health insurance could be used free of charge and
formal payments were mostly paid for private services.
We assume that households with higher income use
proportionally more private services. The finding that
the expenditures on formal payments increase propor-
tionally to income indicates that the private health care
services are seen as a luxury goods which is in accord-
ance with previous findings [38].
Based on previous results, we expect that that health
care reforms, which increase the role of out-of-pocket
payments in health care financing, lead to a relatively
greater burden (of private payments) falling on the low
income groups [5-7]. We find the same in the case of
expenditures on formal payments. Compared to the
observed proportionality in the previous years in 2007
when co-payments for public health care services were
introduced, expenditures on formal payments became
more regressive despite of the application of exemptioncategories (which were mainly based on the type of care
not on income situation) and a stop-loss.
On the other hand, we find that despite of the increase
of the co-payments for pharmaceuticals, the progressiv-
ity of expenditures on pharmaceuticals and medical
devices did not change during the reform period. Thus,
they remain as regressive as before the reforms.
Finally, we have interesting findings concerning house-
hold expenditure on informal payments. In CEE coun-
tries the introduction of co-payments is often motivated
by their potential to eradicate or formalize informal pay-
ments [39-41]. This was also the case in Hungary where
one of the main aims of the introduction of official user
fees (besides the objective of curbing the unnecessary
use of health care services) was to eradicate informal
payments [42]. In this study, we observe a decrease in
informal payments of households in parallel to the in-
crease of formal payments. Also, this expenditure be-
came less regressive during the reform period (i.e. the
decrease was higher in the lower income households).
This finding might suggest that worse-off households
tried to compensate the increasing burden of formal co-
payments with decrease in their expenditure on informal
payments. However, we cannot really measure the caus-
ality of this association. Furthermore, the improvement
observed in the equity of informal payments might also
be the resultant of the larger drop in the utilization of
services among worse-off households, which leads to less
informal payments. Further research is needed to clarify
the relationship between formal and informal
expenditure.
Discussion of the limitations
We have to acknowledge some limitations of our study.
First, we have to highlight that the National Household
Budget Survey does not contain data on the utilization
of services. However, according to previous literature,
the reform arrangements have resulted in major changes
in the utilization of health care [43-45]. Due to the lack
of utilization data in the dataset, we cannot quantify the
effect of the increase in co-payments on the access to
health care across households with different income.
However, it is possible that in worse-off households the
drop in utilization is higher as based on previous stud-
ies they are assumed to be the most sensitive to price
changes [46,47]. In this case, we underestimate the in-
crease of the burden in these households. To have a
better insight in the effect of the reforms on equity,
equity in access to the services should be also consid-
ered and should be the topic further research.
We have to highlight that for the calculations we use a
data on household level. This might result in slight dif-
ferences with previous results from Hungary [31,32]
which are based on individual data.
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ined period, multiple, simultaneous reforms (in and out-
side of the health care sector as a result of the
Convergence Program) took place in Hungary. It is diffi-
cult to differentiate between the effects of separate re-
form arrangements on the household expenditure.
Conclusion and policy recommendations
In this paper, we have examined the progressivity of
households’ out-of-pocket payments and the distribution
of these payments across income quintiles between
2005–2008: before, during and after the period of health
care reforms in Hungary (2006–2007). In 2007, compre-
hensive health care reforms took place in the country,
with arrangements aimed at shifting costs to consumers
(e.g. the increase of the co-payments for pharmaceuti-
cals, the introduction of co-payments for health care
services).
Expenditures on pharmaceuticals and medical devices,
are the most regressive payments and represents the
highest share of households’ health care expenditure
(more than 75 %). However the progressivity of these
payments has not changed during the reform period. Fu-
ture health care reforms should consider the improve-
ment of the equity of these payments by the
improvement of protection mechanisms i.e. the intro-
duction of a maximum limit for co-payments for phar-
maceuticals and medical devices or the implementations
of exemption mechanisms of vulnerable social groups.
We find that in the case of formal payments, changes
such as the introduction of co-payments for public
health care services, led to a relatively greater burden
falling on low income groups despite of the application
of exemption categories and a stop-loss. These effects
on access to health care services should be carefully con-
sidered before the increase/introduction of co-payments
and special attention should be paid to the protection of
vulnerable households from an increased burden on
their household budgets. It is necessary to assure access
to health care services for those who are not able to pay
for the services. Our results also suggest that house-
holds, especially in the lower income deciles tried to
compensate the increasing burden of health care ex-
penditure by decreasing expenditures on informal pay-
ments. However, further research is needed to study the
causality of these relations.
The results of our study might serve as a useful ex-
ample for other European countries, where the expan-
sion of patient cost-sharing is considered. Especially in
the Central and Eastern European countries that joined
the EU in and after 2004, since in these countries, the
structure, financing and operation of the health care sys-
tem are similar to those in Hungary. Furthermore, in the
last decades, these countries all considered or have beenconsidering an increase of out-of-pocket payments to
cope with the continuous deficit of the health insurance
funds, and financial difficulties of health care providers.
More attention should be paid to the protection of
vulnerable social groups (in particular the poor) when
implementing patient charges (especially for pharmaceu-
ticals but also for services). Also, it is important to elim-
inate the practice of informal payments in order to
improve equity in health care financing and to avoid in-
equalities in access to health care.Endnotes
a See more details on the survey here: http://portal.
ksh.hu/pls/ksh/ksh_web.meta.objektum?p_lang=EN&p_
menu_id=110&p_ot_id=100&p_obj_id=ZHC&p_session_
id=48488026; b See more details on the classification
here, http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=352; c
See more details here: http://portal.ksh.hu/pls/ksh/
ksh_web.meta.objektum?p_lang=EN&p_menu_id=410&p_
almenu_id=101&p_ot_id=100&p_level=1&p_session_id=
15276620&p_obj_id=ZHC; d See more on concentra-
tion curves in Quantitative Techniques for Health
Equity Analysis—Technical Note #6 http://siteresources.
worldbank.org/INTPAH/Resources/Publications/Quantitative-
Techniques/health_eq_tn06.pdf; e Disabled and those per-
sons are enabled for the certificate whose medical expenses
exceed 10 % of the minimum pension and the family in-
come per person do not exceed the minimum pension (in
2010 around 100 euros) or 150 % in case of the person is
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